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PROTECTIVE SWEEP INCIDENT TO A
LAWFUL ARREST: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
VALIDITY UNDER TIE FEDERAL AND
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCION
As the United States Supreme Court provides decreased pro-
tection for individuals' rights, individuals are increasingly look-
ing to their respective state constitutions to provide protection of
their individual rights. 1 The guiding principle behind this
movement is that the United States Constitution establishes
minimum standards, upon which the states are free to expand. 2 In
the areas of criminal law and procedure, where infringement of
individual rights can potentially lead to drastic results, state
1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977); see generally
Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie, John Kincaid, State High Courts, State
Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey,
13 HAsT. CONST. L. Q. 599 (1986) (survey of recent litigation in area of
individual rights); Note, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982) (discussing
developments in state constitutional rights areas) [hereinafter Developments in
the Law].
2. See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78,
82, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, (1978) ("Under our own State due process clause
(N.Y. State Const. art. I, § 6) this court may impose higher standards than
those held to be necessary by the Supreme Court under the corresponding
Federal constitutional provision ... ."); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at
491 ("[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full
protection of the federal constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protection often extending beyond those required by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law."); Collins, supra note 1, at
599 ("A growing number of state high courts have been construing their own
constitutions in a way recognizing 'greater' protection for individual rights that
has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the
federal Constitution."); Developments in the Lav, supra note 1, at 1368 n.3
("[The requirements established by the Supreme Court set an effective lower
bound on state constitutional interpretation ....").
1
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constitutional protections are particularly important. 3
This Comment addresses the issue of whether or not a
"protective sweep" incident to lawful arrest is constitutional un-
der both federal and New York law. It examines the "protective
sweep" doctrine, pursuant to which police officers may have a
right to conduct a limited search of a premises, without a
warrant, in order to assure their safety after a lawful arrest. 4 Part
One of this Comment provides a legal backdrop to this issue. Part
Two examines this issue under federal law. Part Three addresses
this issue under New York law. Because there seems to be a
relative dearth of case law from the New York Court of Appeals
regarding the constitutionality of protective sweeps incident to a
lawful arrest, 5 this Comment focuses on general decisions from
the New York Court of Appeals which have dealt with the
broader subject of searches incident to a lawful arrest under the
New York State Constitution. 6 It also discusses several New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division7 decisions that directly
considered the issue of protective sweeps, and in addition it
probes other jurisdictions to see how the highest court in those
states dealt with the issue. This analysis may give some insight as
to how the New York Court of Appeals might rule on a
protective sweep case if it was to hear one.
Finally, this Comment concludes that "protective sweeps" are
3. See Collins, supra note 1, at 613-14 (data in survey shows that state
constitutional claims are more likely to be raised in criminal justice cases than
in non-criminal rights cases); Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1370-
84 (discussion of criminal procedure under state constitutions).
4. See infra notes 24-226 and accompanying text (discussing protective
sweep doctrine and scope).
5. See People v. Febus, 157 A.D.2d 380, 382, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1000,
1001 (1st Dep't), appeal granted, 76 N.Y.2d 898, 562 N.E.2d 885, 561
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 835, 568 N.E.2d 652, 567
N.Y.S.2d 203 (1991) (discussing "dearth" of cases on point on the issue of
protective sweeps on the federal level). It should be noted that the New York
Court of Appeals had an opportunity to address the issue, but chose not to.
6. See infra notes 114-77; see also infra note 16 (citing N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 12).
7. Although the appellate division departments are at a lower level than
that of the court of appeals, a comprehensive analysis of the protective sweep
issue must not ignore lower court decisions that are close to or on point.
[Vol 8762
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constitutional under federal law with certain limitations, and that
the New York Court of Appeals is not likely to expand the
privacy rights of its citizens under the New York State
Constitution and will hold that "protective sweeps" are
constitutional under New York law as well.
I. LEGAL BACKDROP
Through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,8 the United States Supreme Court has incorporated
to the states9 those portions of the Bill of Rights which it views
as "fundamental to the American scheme of justice .... ",10
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("[n]o State . ..shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...")
9. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968). Duncan is the
case most often cited as the basis for the "incorporation doctrine." See id. In
Duncan, the Supreme Court discussed those rights arising under the Federal
Constitution that it had previously held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Id.; see infra note 10. The Court further recognized
that the sixth amendment "right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a
fundamental right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their
obligation to extend due process of law to all persons within their
jurisdiction." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154.
10. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. The test of whether the right guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution with respect to federal proceedings is also
protected against state action by the fourteenth amendment has been phrased in
a number of ways including: "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,"' Id. (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)); rights "'basic in our system of
jurisprudence,"' Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)); and
"'fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."'Id. (quoting Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963)).
Those rights which have been held binding on the states under the due
process provisions of the fourteenth amendment are as follows: the right to
compensation for property taken by the state, Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228-30 (1897); the rights of speech, press, and
religion covered by the first amendment, see, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380, 387 (1927); the fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); the
exclusionary rule requiring that the result of a violation of this prohibition not
be used as evidence against the defendant, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657
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Pursuant to the "incorporation doctrine," 11 there exist certain
basic constitutional restraints on criminal procedure. 12 The
Fourth Amendment, 13 which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, 14 is one such provision that has been incorporated to the
states in this manner. 15 The New York State Constitution pro-
vides protection similar to those provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 16
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); prohibition against double jeopardy,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 785 (1969); the sixth amendment rights to
counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963); to a speedy trial,
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 214 (1967); public trial, In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948); to confrontation of opposing witnesses,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1965); to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 15 (1967); trial by
jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968); and the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson v.
California, 371 U.S 905, 905 (1962).
11. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the exclusion from trials of any evidence illegally
seized); U.S. CONST. amend. V (privilege against compelled self-incrimination
and double jeopardy); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to counsel, to speedy and
public trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses, to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, and to jury trial); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); see also infra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text (discussing incorporation of these amendments to the
states).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmance, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
14. Id.
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("[E]vidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court ....").
16. N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. This section states, in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
[Vol 8
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Pursuant to what has come to be known as the "exclusionary
rule," 17 evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search is
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the de-
fendant. 18 In addition, not only is illegally obtained evidence ex-
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
17. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The first case to address the use of evidence
obtained during an unconstitutional search was Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. at 398. In Weeks, the Court concluded that to admit evidence illegally
seized by federal officers would, in effect, put a stamp of approval on their
unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 394. The Court stated that "[teo sanction
[unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law] would be
to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." Id.
In Mapp, the Court further held that "all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation 'of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in state court." Id. at 655. The Court reasoned that:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were
it otherwise then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id.
18. See supra note 17. The primary purposes of the exclusionary rule are
the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures, "the imperative of
judicial integrity" - that the courts not become "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold," and "of assuring the
people - all potential victims of unlawful government conduct that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the
risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government." W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 80 (1985) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Linkletter v. Walder, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 *(1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v.
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cluded, but all evidence obtained or derived from exploitation of
that evidence must also be excluded. 19
The general rule is that for a legal search and seizure to exist, a
police officer must have a validly executed search warrant.
20
However, one exception to this general rule21 is that a search in-
cident to a lawful arrest is permitted. 22 A remaining question
concerns the permissible scope of this search.
23
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Protective Sweep Defined
A "protective sweep" is defined as "a quick and limited search
19. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)
(test of excludability is not whether evidence would not have come to light but
for the illegal actions of the police, but whether evidence was come to by
exploitation of illegality rather than by a means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of primary taint); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41
(1939) ("[The] essence of a [statutory] provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before court, [in a criminal case,] but that it shall not be used at all.").
20. See supra note 13 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which is the
constitutional basis for this requirement); see also W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 18, § 3.4, at 126-40 (discussing necessity and requirements for
validly executed search warrants).
21. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, (1978). All warrantless
searches are unconstitutional unless they fit into one of six recognized
exceptions to warrant requirement. Id. at 313-14. These six exceptions are:
search incident to a lawful arrest; the "Automobile" exception; the "Plain
View" doctrine; search in response to exigent circumstances; search by
consent; and stop and frisk searches. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 18,
§§ 3.5-4.5, at 141-200.
22. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1973) (police
may conduct search incident to arrest whenever full custodial arrest is
authorized for offense; they need not actually fear for their safety or believe
that they will find evidence of crime); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,
263-64 (1973) (companion case to Robinson).
23. See infra notes 27-226 and accompanying text (discussing
constitutional scope of search incident to lawful arrest).
[Vol 8766
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of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the
safety of police officers or others. " 24 "It is narrowly confined to
a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person
might be hiding." 25 The sweep is justified in an arrest situation
because of the need to ensure an officer's safety by uncovering
persons other than the arrestee who may be concealing their pres-
ence on the premises, and consequently pose a threat to the ar-
resting officers. 26
B. The Chimel Era
The narrow issue of whether arresting officers have the right to
"protectively sweep" premises in order to protect their safety did
not arise until the United States Supreme Court addressed it in
Chimel v. California.2 7 Prior to Chimel, officers were authorized
to conduct a complete search of the entire premises if the search
was incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest occurred on those
premises. 2 8 The Court in Chimel extensively reviewed the
conflicting authority regarding the permissible scope of a search
incident to a lawful arrest, 2 9 and narrowed the doctrine
24. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). See infra notes 72-108
and accompanying text.
25. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. The sweep may extend to inspection of those
areas that are large enough so that a human being may be found. Id. A
protective sweep occurs as an adjunct to the serious step of taking a person into
custody. Id. at 333.
26. See Paul R. Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting
Arresting Officers From Attack By Persons Other Than The Arrestee, 33 CATH.
U. L. REv. 95, 97 (1983). A study of 110 police shootings reported that 19%
of the shootings were attributed to "'[flailure to search the suspects or rooms
properly."' Id. at n.12 (quoting Bristow, Police Officer Shootings - A
Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 94 (1963)).
27. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of
defendant's business incident to lawful anest was legal because it fell within
principle giving law enforcement authorities right to search place where arrest
was made in order to find and seize things connected with crime), overruled by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also United States v. Harris,
435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971).
29. See Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, 755-62 (1969). Approval of a warrantless
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1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the
Court recognized the right under American law "to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime." Id. at 392. Eleven years later, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), the Court expanded upon Weeks by holding that "[w]hen a
[person] is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person
or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used
to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution."
Id. at 158. In neither of these two cases did the Court indicate that the place
where one is arrested may be searched. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398; Carroll,
267 U.S. at 155-56.
In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), however, the Court
expanded on its previous holdings. Id. at 30-31. The Court stated that "the
right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully
arrested while committing [a] crime and to search the place where the arrest is
made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. . . is not to
be doubted." d. at 30.
In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the Court held that agents
who had searched items and areas not covered by a search warrant "had a right
without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and
seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." Id. at 199.
In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Court upheld an
officer's search through an entire apartment in an attempt to uncover two
canceled checks. Id. at 149. The Court rejected Harris' fourth amendment
claim, and sustained the search as "incident to arrest." Id. at 151. Here, the
officers looked in Harris' desk drawer and went through his sealed papers in
order to obtain crucial evidence of his crime. Id.
One year after Harris, the Supreme Court's pendulum swung. In Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Court stated that agents who raided
and searched an illicit distillery violated the fourth amendment and rendered
the search unlawful by their failure to procure a search warrant, in spite of the
fact that they had more than enough time before the raid to obtain a search
warrant. Id. at 705. The Court stated that "[i]t is a cardinal rule that, in
seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search
warrants wherever reasonably practicable." Id. "This rule rests upon the
desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers determine when
searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed
upon such activities." Id. A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident
to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It
grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the same time of the
arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a
lawful arrest. Id. at 708.
Two years later the pendulum swung back in United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), when the Court held that a search of the defendant's
8
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previously delineated by the Supreme Court. 30
In the Term before Chimel was decided, the Court in Terry v.
Ohio31 concluded that in a "stop and frisk" street arrest, an
officer did not unreasonably search a suspect when the officer
had a "reasonable suspicion" that the suspect was armed and
dangerous. 32 The Court explained that the balance between the
need to search and the right of the individual to be free from
governmental intrusion is the basis of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard. 33 Further, the Court explained that "in
justifying the... intrusion[,] the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."-3
4
In Chimel, police officers, possessing a valid arrest warrant for
the perpetrator of a coin shop burglary, arrived at the house of
the petitioner and placed him in custody. 35 When the officers
requested permission to look around the house, the petitioner ob-
jected.36 Nevertheless, on the basis of the lawful arrest, the offi-
cers conducted a search of the petitioner's entire three-bedroom
house, including his garage, attic, and a small workshop, even
though no search warrant had been issued. 37 The officers then
directed the petitioner's wife to move the contents of the drawers
in the master bedroom so that they could view any items that may
business incident to a lawful arrest was legal because it fell within the principle
giving law enforcement authorities "the right to 'search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime'
.... "Id. at 61 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392); see also supra note 25 and
accompanying text. At the time of the arrest in Rabinowitz, the officers
searched cabinets, a safe, and a desk for forged stamps, which were eventually
found and admitted into evidence. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 59. The Court
cited Harris as "ample authority" for its conclusion. Id. at 63.
30. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 772, 780 (White, J., dissenting). See also
infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
31. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 20-21.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.
36. Id.
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have been lifted in the burglary. 38 They seized several items,
including coins which later turned out to be those taken in the
burglary. 39
The coins were admitted into evidence over the petitioner's
objection that they were unconstitutionally seized. 40 The peti-
tioner was subsequently convicted. 41 His conviction was affirmed
by the California Court of Appeals 42 and then by the state's
highest court, the California Supreme Court. 43
The United States Supreme Court held that the search was un-
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and reversed the peti-
tioner's conviction. 44 The Court reasoned that "there [wa]s am-
ple justification... for a search of the arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control'. . . mean[ing] the area from
within which he might gain [or grab] possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence." ' 45 The Court stated, however, that
"[t]here is no comparable justification . . . for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs,"
and that such searches must "'adher[e] to [the] judicial processes'
mandated by the Fourth Amendment." 46
Although Chimel narrowed the Court's previous interpretation
of the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, 47 it did not





42. People v. Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714, 715 (1967), aft'd, 439 P.2d
333, 338, (Cal. 1968), rev'd, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
43. People v. Chimel, 439 P.2d 333, 338 (Cal. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
44. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
45. Id. The area which the arrestee might grab or reach for control of a
weapon is often referred to as the "grab area." Id. See People v. Gokey, 60
N.Y.2d 309, 312, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1983);
infra note 61 and accompanying text.
46. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; see also supra notes 13, 20 and
accompanying text.
47. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48. Gary Kelder & Alan J. Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine:
Recurrent Questions Regarding The Propriety of Searches Conducted
770 [Vol 8
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/3
PROTECTIVE SWEEP
cated that a primary reason for upholding such searches is the
strong concern for the safety of arresting officers, 49 suggesting a
willingness on the part of the Court to consider a broader right to
search as a precautionary measure in circumstances which might
pose a threat to police officers. 50 However, the Court in Chimel
did not positively affirm that a protective sweep is lawful.
C. The Post-Chimel Era
Despite the fact that many courts have subsequently interpreted
Chimel as banning only "routine" warrantless searches, and not
searches that are conducted under exigent circumstances, 51
Chimel's basic doctrine has been extended. 52
In United States v. Robinson,53 the Court concluded that if a
search is incident to a lawful arrest, the search is permissible
whether or not weapons or evidence reasonably could be expected
to be discovered. 54 The Court in Robinson reasoned that the risks
to officers in any arrest situation are high, and that all arrests
should, therefore, be treated alike in measuring the permissible
scope of a search incident to those arrests. 55
Contemporaneously With An Arrest On Or Near Private Premises, 30
SYRACUSE L. REv. 973, 1069-70 (1979).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 48, at 1069-70. Exigent
circumstances exist where there is an emergency due to the possibility that
escape by the arrestee is likely or that evidence may be removed by him or her.
Id.
52. See infra notes 59-108 and accompanying text.
53. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
54. Id. at 224. In Robinson, the respondent was arrested for driving
without a license, a crime for which no tangible evidence exists. Id. at 220.
The officer searched the arrestee and found a "crumpled up" cigarette
package. Id. at 223. The officer opened the package and found heroin inside
even though it was implausible that a weapon could be concealed in the
package. Id. The Court went further in Robinson than it did in Tery, because
in Terry the officers were only allowed to search an item that could conceal a
weapon. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968). In Robinson, an item
that clearly could not contain a weapon was examined. Robinson, 414 U.S. at
221 n.2.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
In New York v. Belton,56 the Court held "that when a police-
man has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an au-
tomobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile."' 57 The
Court stated that "the police may also examine the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also
will containers in it be within reach." 58
Belton is in line with Robinson, in that it seems to indicate the
Court's willingness to extend searches incident to a lawful arrest
beyond the "grab area" as defined by Chimel.59 However, in the
dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan indicated that they feared
Belton was an unwarranted abandonment of the principles under-
lying Chimel and that it might signal a wholesale retreat from the
Court's carefully developed search incident to arrest analysis. 60
The dissent further added that:
By approving the constitutionality of the warrantless search in
this case, the Court carves out a dangerous precedent that is not
justified by the concerns underlying Chimel. Disregarding the
principle "that the scope of a warrantless search must be com-
mensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from the
warrant requirement," . . . the Court for the first time grants
police officers authority to conduct a warrantless "area" search
under circumstances where there is no chance that the arrestee
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 61
In 1983, the foundations for the language used in Maryland v.
Buie,62 the most recent case on point 63 were laid down in
Michigan v. Long.64 In Long, the Court stated that its previous
56. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
57. Id. at 460. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text.
58. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
59. Id. at 463-64.
60. Id. (Marshall, and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 468 (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (emphasis added).
62. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
63. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text (discussing Buie).
64. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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cases indicated that the policy of providing protection for police
officers might justify protective searches when the police have a
reasonable belief that there is danger present. 65 The Court
concluded that:
[T]he search of a passenger compartment of an automobile, lim-
ited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden,
is permissible [under the Fourth Amendment] if the police
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons. 66
In Long, the police found marihuana in the passenger
compartment of petitioner's car.67 The police searched the
compartment because they believed that the vehicle contained
weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. 68 The Court held
that the police search was reasonable under the principles
articulated in Terry 69 and other decisions of the Court. 70
Even after Long, there existed a need for a more definite stan-
dard with regard to the scope of searches incident to lawful ar-
rests, particularly in the area of protective sweeps. 7 1
In 1990, the landmark case of Maryland v. Buie,72 which is the
current state of the federal law with respect to protective sweeps,
65. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
66. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
67. Long, 463 U.S. at 1034-35.
68. Id. at 1035. The officers observed Long driving his car at excessive
speeds and subsequently the car ended up in a ditch. Id. After the suspect
refused to produce his driver's license, both officers noticed a knife on the
floor of the car and decided to search the car for other weapons. Id. at 1036.
69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In balancing the need to search against the
invasion of the suspect's privacy, the Terry court justified similar searches,
such as the one in Terry, when the police officer can "point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, [would] reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id.
70. Long, 463 U.S. at 1035.
71. Joseph, supra note 26, at 143-44.
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was decided. 73 The Court was required to determine what level
of justification is necessitated by the Fourth Amendment74 before
police officers, in the process of an in-house arrest pursuant to an
arrest warrant, may conduct a protective sweep of all or part of
the premises without a search warrant. 75 The Court concluded
that a protective sweep incident to a lawful arrest was permissible
if the searching officer "'possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] the
officer in believing' that the area swept harbored an individual
posing a danger to the officer or others."
76
In Buie, two men committed an armed robbery of a restaurant
and one of them was seen wearing a red running suit.77 The po-
lice obtained arrest warrants for respondent Buie and his ac-
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation
doctrine).
75. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. It should be noted that such a "protective
sweep" is not a full search of the premises, but is limited "to a cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found." Id. at 335. The
sweep shall not last any longer than it takes to complete the arrest or to dispel
the reasonable suspicion of danger. Id. at 335-36. See also supra notes 24-26
and accompanying text (discussing definition of "protective sweep").
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence seized in plain view
during the protective sweep should be suppressed because the officers who
conducted the sweep did not have probable cause to believe that a "serious and
demonstrable potentiality for danger existed." Buie v. State, 550 A.2d 79, 86
(Md. 1988).
76. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049-50 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The vote was 7-2,
with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. Id. at 326.
It appears that due to the fact that Justice Brennan has retired from the Court
and has been replaced by the more conservative Justice Souter, the holding in
Buie is on even more solid ground today. Support for this prediction is
evidenced in the recent case of Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). In
Bostick, the Court held that police officers may conduct warrantless searches
or "sweeps" of buses, including all luggage, without even a "reasonable
suspicion" as articulated by Terry, Long, and Buie. See id. This shows the
Court's apparent willingness to dilute the protection given to private citizens
by the fourth amendment.
77. Buie, 494 U.S. at 328.
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complice and subsequently executed the arrest warrant for Buie at
his house.78 Once inside the house, the officers searched through
the first and second floors and one officer went 'to the basement
in order to "freeze" it so that no one could come up and surprise
the officers. 79 Buie emerged from the basement and was placed
in custody.80 A second officer went down to the basement to see
if another suspect was there. 81 While the officer was in the
basement he spotted a red running suit, which was admitted into
evidence at Buie's subsequent trial.
8 2
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial
court's denial to suppress the evidence of the red running suit.83
The court reasoned that although a person's home is his "castle,"
a fact that usually requires police to have probable cause and a
warrant to invade this privacy, there is an exception where exi-
gent circumstances exist. 84 The court stated that "if there is rea-
son to believe that the arrestee ha[s] accomplices who are still at
large, something less than probable cause - reasonable suspicion
-- should be sufficient to justify a limited additional intrusion to
investigate the possibility of their presence." 85
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed this decision, 86
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 87 The
question presented to the United States Supreme Court was what
level of justification is required by the Fourth Amendment before
police officers can enter premises to search for individuals other
than the individual legally arrested.88






83. Buie v. State, 531 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Md. 1987), rev'd, 550 A.2d 79,
86-87 (Md. 1988), vacated, Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
84. Id. at 1297.
85. Id.
86. Buie v. State, 550 A.2d 79, 86-87 (Md. 1988), vacated, Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (reversal was by 4 to 3 vote).
87. Maryland v. Buie, 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).
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protective sweeps incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a
"balanc[ing of] the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests."' 89 The Court explained that there is "no
ready test for determining reasonableness [of searches] other than
by balancing the need to search . . against the invasion which
the... search.., entails."
90
The Supreme Court referred to Terry as "most instructive" 91
on the issue of protective sweeps, and rationalized its holding in
Buie by analogizing it to the Terry holding. 92 The Court indi-
cated that the Terry standard of "reasonable belief, based on spe-
cific and articulable facts" in warrantless searches is also
applicable to protective sweep situations. 93 While in Terry, the
Court held that this standard applies to whether the arrestee was
armed and dangerous, 94 in Buie, the Court held that it applies to
whether the area to be swept harbors dangerous individuals. 95
After taking into account its holdings in Terry and Long, 96 the
Buie Court concluded that the officers were entitled to search
anywhere in the house in which Buie might be found. 97 The
Court added that "once [Buie] was found,... the search for him
was over, and there was no longer that particular justification for
entering any rooms that had not yet been searched." 98 However,
the Court qualified this statement by explaining that Buie's expec-
89. Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,
588 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
90. Id. at 332 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
91. Id. at 331.
92. Id. at 331-32. It appears that the Court found the Terly street arrest
scenario analogous to the Buie house arrest scenario. See id. This analogy can
also be made to the Long case, which uses the same "specific and articulable
facts" language to justify an officer's search of an automobile. Long, 463 U.S.
at 1049-50. In Long, however, the officer's belief was related to the suspects
ability to gain control of a weapon. Id.
93. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332.
94. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
95. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.
96. Id. at 332.
97. Id. at 332-33.
98. Id. at 333.
776 [Vol 8
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/3
PROTECTIVE SWEEP
tation of privacy for the undisturbed rooms of his house does not
immunize the rooms from entry by the officers if the officers
were taking steps to assure themselves that Buie's house did not
harbor any dangerous persons who could "unexpectedly launch
an attack" on them. 99 The Court stated that the interest of the
officer's safety is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion that such a
sweep may entail, and that this is "no more and no less than was
required in Terry and Long, and as in those cases, we think this
balance is the proper one." 10
The Court further rationalized its extension of Chimel's "grab
area" 10 1 holding to Buie's "sweep of the premises" 10 2 holding
by pointing out that Chimel dealt with a "full-blown search of the
entire house" and "not the more limited intrusion contemplated
by a protective sweep." ' 10 3 In addition, the Court indicated that
the type of search authorized in Buie was far removed from the
top-to-bottom search involved in Chimel, and it "may be con-
ducted only when justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion
that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on
the arrest scene." 104
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with the reasoning of
the majority opinion, but articulated certain reservations regard-
ing the protective nature of such searches. 105 He questioned why
99. The Court stated that "an in home arrest put the officer at the
disadvantage of being on his adversary's 'tu..... [and that] [a]n ambush in a
confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in
open, more familiar surroundings." Id.
100. Id. at 334. An analogous case is Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979), where the Court stated that although armed with a warrant to search a
bar and bartender, the police could not frisk the bar's patrons absent
individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person to be frisked was armed
and presently dangerous. Id. at 90 n.2, 92-93. The Court further stated that the
reasonable suspicion standard strikes the proper balance between officer safety
and citizen privacy. Id. at 95-96.
101. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ("grab area" is area into which arrestee
might reach to gain immediate control of dangerous weapon). See supra note
45.
102. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
103. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336.
104. Id.
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an officer who was concerned about his safety would risk
searching the basement without any backup help, and stated that
in order for these searches to be reasonable, they must truly be
protective in nature. 106
The dissent criticized the "emerging tendency on the part of the
Court to convert the Terry decision from a narrow exception into
one that swallow[s] the general rule that [searches] are
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." ' 107 The dissent
concluded that "police officers must have probable cause to fear
that their personal safety is threatened by a hidden confederate of
an arrestee before they may sweep through the entire home." 108
As the discussion above manifests, a protective sweep incident
to lawful arrest is constitutional under federal law, provided the
appropriate standard is followed by the searching police officers.
This standard requires that the police officers possess a reason-
able belief, based on specific and articulable facts, which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the officer in believing that the area swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to the officer or others.
III. NEW YORK LAW
A. Court of Appeals Cases
As previously discussed, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly maintained that the Federal Constitution establishes
only a base level of protection for individual rights, 109 and that
"a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater re-
strictions on police activity." 110 However, as the New York
106. Id. at 337-38 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 340 (Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719 (1983)). Justice Marshall added that "the
Court's implicit judgment that a protective sweep constitutes a 'minimally
intrusive' search akin to that involved in Terry markedly undervalues the
nature and scope of the privacy interests involved." Id. at 341.
108. Buie, 494 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
109. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
110. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis added). See,
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Court of Appeals has pointed out, the "mere fact that [a] State
Constitution might establish greater restrictions on police activity
does not compel the conclusion that it does establish such greater
restrictions." '111 The New York State Constitution provides simi-
lar protection to the Fourth Amendment in the area of searches
and seizures. 112 The remaining question is whether the New
York Court of Appeals has granted greater protection to
individuals in the area of search and seizures incident to lawful
arrest than is established by the federal law articulated above. 113
In People v. Gonzalez, 114 the New York Court of Appeals held
that a search of the defendant's home was unreasonable due to the
fact that his consent was involuntary.115 The court stated that in
the absence of a valid search warrant, governmental intrusion into
the privacy of the home was prohibited under the New York State
Constitution. 116 The court reasoned that "[e]ven if an individual
e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (standing for same
proposition); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
111. People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 56-57, 432 N.E.2d 745, 748-49, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873, 876-77 (1982) (Gabrielli, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
112. See supra note 16 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12).
113. The New York Court of Appeals has recently decided People v. Keta,
165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991), rev'd, People v. Scott;
People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 VL 62774 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992), and People
v. Scott, 169 A.D.2d 1023, 565 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991), rev'd, People
v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992),
which gave New York citizens more protection under the New York State
Constitution than they would have been provided under the Federal
Constitution. Kevin Sack, New York Court Voids Searches Allowed by U.S.,
N.Y. TWMEs, April 3, 1992, at Al, B6. Although these cases dealt with the
issue of unreasonable search and seizures, they were not directly on point with
the protective sweep issue. These cases did not deal with searches incident to a
lawful arrest, nor a security check of the premises. The search of an open field
as in Scott, or a business as in Keta, does not provide the need for a protective
sweep. Therefore, when the court balances the need for the search versus the
intrusion of privacy on the citizen, the scales will be weighted differently.
114. 39 N.Y.2d 122, 347 N.E.2d 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1976).
115. Id. at 127, 347 N.E.2d at 579, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
116. Id. In Gonzalez, the defendant was arrested on cocaine possession in
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has been lawfully arrested, the police are not thereby free to con-
duct a full-blown, rummaging search of the arrested person's
home without a warrant." 117
In People v. Belton,118 the court of appeals held that a warrant-
less search of a closed container visible in the passenger com-
partment of an automobile was permissible under the New York
State Constitution, and was not improper because the search fell
under the automobile exception to the general warrant require-
ment. 119 The court compared the Federal and New York State
Constitutions, and stated that "[t]he identical wording of the two
provisions does not proscribe our more strictly construing the
State Constitution than the Supreme Court has construed the
Federal Constitution." 120 Extending the principles of Chimel121
N.Y.S.2d at 217. After a struggle with drug enforcement agents, he yelled to
his wife to lock the apartment door. Id. The officers then entered the apartment
and conducted a search of all the closets for any other possible occupants. Id.
117. Id. (citing People v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 678-79, 339 N.E.2d
170, 172, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (1975); People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462,
468, 315 N.E.2d 452, 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383, 389 (1974); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969)).
118. 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874
(1982). This case is the final disposition of the case New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981), which was heard by the United States Supreme Court and
remanded to the New York Court of Appeals.
119. Id. A separate exception to the warrant requirement is recognized with
respect to automobiles. Id. Its justification is based on "the reduced
expectation of privacy associated with automobiles and the inherent mobility of
such vehicles." Id. at 53, 432 N.E.2d at 747, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 875. In Belton,
an officer searched through a jacket that was in the back seat of the car after
the defendant had already been placed under arrest for possessing an envelope
of marihuana, and found cocaine in a zippered pocket. Id. at 51, 432 N.E.2d
at 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 874. The court concluded that incident to a lawful
arrest, if the police "have reason to believe that the car may contain evidence
related to the crime for which the occupant was arrested or that a weapon may
be discovered or a means of escape thwarted, they may contemporaneously
search the passenger compartment, including any containers found therein."
Id. at 55, 432 N.E.2d at 748, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (Cooke, J., delivered
opinion of court).
120. Id. at 51, 432 N.E.2d at 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (operative
language of the fourth amendment and article I, § 12 of New York State
Constitution is the same).
121. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text (discussing Chimel).
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to the facts of this case, the court of appeals found that the
Supreme Court, in New York v. Belton, 122 departed from the ra-
tionale in Chimel because the defendant's jacket was neither on
his person nor within his reach. 123 The court concluded that
"[o]nce the exception is employed to justify a warrantless search
for objects outside an arrested person's reach it no longer has any
distinct spatial boundary."' 124
The Belton concurrence differed from the majority in its views
on the ramifications identical language of the New York State
and Federal Constitutions has on search and seizure law. 125
Citing People v. Ponder,126 the concurrence stated that "section
12 of article I of the New York Constitution conforms with the
Fourth Amendment regarding the proscription against unreason-
able searches and seizures, and this identity of language supports
a policy of uniformity in both State and Federal courts." 127 The
concurrence reasoned that there should not be two conflicting
rules with respect to an officer's power to search incident to a
lawful arrest and if the police officer adheres to the mandate of
the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, his or her
conduct should not be held to be invalid under the state constitu-
tion. 128
The Belton dissent, however, pointed out that as the New York
Court of Appeals has held before, "where the language of the
two Constitutions is precisely the same, there need be no uni-
formity of interpretation." 129 The dissent reasoned that "so long
122. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra notes 56-58.
123. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 53, 432 N.E.2d at 747, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
The defendant was outside the vehicle and his jacket was inside the vehicle
with its pocket zippered. ld.; see supra note 45.
124. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 53, 432 N.E.2d at 747, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
125. Id. at 57, 432 N.E.2d at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring).
126. 54 N.Y.2d 160, 429 N.E.2d 735, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
127. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 57, 432 N.E.2d at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877
(Gabrielli, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 58, 432 N.E.2d at 750, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring).
129. Id. at 60, 432 N.E.2d at 751, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Fuchsberg, J.,
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as freedom of the individual is thereby enlarged rather than di-
minished, recourse to State Constitutions for vindication of such
regional right to differ [is] provided." ' 130 The dissent added that
New York has not hesitated to avail itself of this principle of
federalism. 131
In People v. Gokey, 132 the court of appeals declined to inter-
pret the New York State Constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizures so narrowly. 133 In Gokey, the court held
that a police officer's search of a defendant's duffel bag was im-
proper. 134 The court stated that "[u]nder the State Constitution,
an individual's right of privacy in his or her effects dictates that a
warrantless search incident to arrest be deemed unreasonable un-
less justified by the presence of exigent circumstances." 135
However, in People v. Smith, 136 the court held that a warrant-
less search of a suspect's briefcase on a subway platform was not
improper under the New York State Constitution. 137 The court
78, 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1978).
130. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 60-61, 432 N.E.2d at 751, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 879
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d at 520,
378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
131. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 60-61, 432 N.E.2d at 751, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 879
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
132. 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983). In this
case, police officers responding to a tip, confronted the defendant upon his
arrival at a bus terminal. Id. at 311, 457 N.E.2d at 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
When the police dogs indicated that there might be drugs in defendant's duffel
bag, the police searched it and found marihuana. Id.
133. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d at 312, 457 N.E.2d at 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
134. Id. at 314, 457 N.E.2d at 725, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
135. Id. at 312, 457 N.E.2d at 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The court held
that because the police did not fear for their safety and because they could not
have reasonably believed that the search of the bag would preserve evidence
that might be inside of it, the warrantless search of the bag was improper. Id.
at 313-14, 457 N.E.2d at 725, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
136. 59 N.Y.2d 454, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1983).
137. Id. at 455-56, 452 N.E.2d at 1225, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The
defendant was caught entering the New York City subway system through an
exit gate, a "theft of services" crime. Id. at 456, 452 N.E.2d at 1225, 465
N.Y.S.2d at 897. The officer noticed that the defendant was wearing a bullet-
proof vest and after the defendant denied that he was wearing one, the officers
arrested him and seized the briefcase he was carrying. Id. at 456, 452 N.E.2d
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stated that it did not subscribe to the defendant's argument that
"the New York Constitution was violated because the briefcase
was searched after he had been effectively neutralized and the
briefcase was in the exclusive control of the police."' 138 The
court reasoned that "a search 'not significantly divorced in time
or place from the arrest' may be conducted even though the ar-
rested person has been subdued and his closed container is within
the exclusive control of the police." 139
The Smith court compared the federal and state constitutions,
and stated that the Supreme Court had interpreted the United
States Constitution as requiring "the drawing of a bright line for
reasons of efficiency between permissible and impermissible
searches." '14 The court further stated that "[w]e have interpreted
the New York Constitution to require that the reasonableness of
each search or seizure be determined on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case." 141
The Smith court noted that in cases regarding the warrantless
search of closed containers, the New York State Constitution has
been read more narrowly than its federal counterpart. 142 The
court also stated, however, that a person's privacy interest in a
closed container "may become subordinate to the need of the
People, under exigent circumstances, to search it for weapons or
evidence.... " 143
at 1226, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The court noted that while the crime the
defendant had just committed was "not one suggestive of the presence of a
weapon, the fact that he was wearing a bullet-proof vest was, and was further
enhanced by his denial of the fact." Id. at 459, 452 N.E.2d at 1227, 465
N.Y.S.2d at 899. Inside the briefcase the officers found a gun. Id. at 456, 452
N.E.2d at 1226, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The defendant was charged with illegal
possession of the gun, and moved to have the evidence suppressed. Id.
138. Id. at 457, 452 N.E.2d at 1226, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
139. Id. at 458, 452 N.E.2d at 1227, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting People
v. DeSantis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 88, 385 N.E.2d 577, 580, 412 N.Y.S2d 838, 841
(1978)).
140. Id. The court applies this bright line rule even though the result is to
occasionally permit an unreasonable search or forbid a reasonable one. Id.
141. Id. at 457, 452 N.E.2d at 1226-27, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
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The Smith concurrence remarked that holding a police officer
to a different standard under the New York State Constitution
than he or she is held under the Federal Constitution creates con-
fusion, and thus, "'a person cannot know the scope of his consti-
tutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his
authority." ' 144 This is a major problem that confronts us with
respect to the constitutionality of protective sweeps under the
New York State Constitution. Until the New York Court of
Appeals rules on this issue, citizens of New York may not know
the level of their constitutional protection and law enforcement
officers may not know the boundaries of their authority.
In People v. Blasich,145 the court of appeals noted that "the
search-incident-to-arrest-exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the [New York] State Constitution exists
only to protect against the danger that an arrestee may gain access
to a weapon or may be able to destroy or conceal critical
evidence." ' 146 In Blasich, a police officer approached the
defendant's vehicle in an airport parking lot because the
defendant failed to pay the parking lot fee. 147 Upon reaching the
car, the officer observed several tools, commonly used to break
into cars, on the floor of the passenger compartment. 148 The
court found that the tools admitted into evidence would not be
suppressed because they were obtained within the scope of a
search incident to a lawful arrest under the state constitution. 149
The court stated that "such a search must be limited to the
arrestee's person and the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 150
One month after Blasich, the court decided People v.
144. Id. at 460, 452 N.E.2d at 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (Jasen, J.,
concurring) (quoting People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 57, 432 N.E.2d 745,
749, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (1982)).
145. 73 N.Y.2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 40, 543 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1989).
146. Id. at 678, 541 N.E.2d at 43, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
147. Id. at 676, 541 N.E.2d at 42, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 677-78, 541 N.E.2d at 43, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
150. Id. at 678, 541 N.E.2d at 43, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
784 (Vol 8
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Torres.151 In Torres, the court of appeals held that "despite the
[United States] Supreme Court's approval" of warrantless
searches of passenger compartments in a suspect's vehicle in
Michigan v. Long, 152 New York's more protective constitutional
provision prohibits such searches and deems them violative of
individuals' rights.153 In Torres, a police officer reached into a
suspect's car and took a shoulder bag from the front seat. 154
While the suspect was being frisked outside the car, the officer
felt the bag and opened it.155 A gun was discovered and
subsequently entered into evidence. 156 The court found "the
actions of the detectives [would] be justified only if the expansive
. Terry v. Ohio 157 'stop and frisk' procedure that was
adopted by Michigan v. Long158 was determined to be consistent
with the privacy rights guaranteed by the New York State
Constitution." 159 The court, however, concluded that it was
not. 160 The court has shown a willingness to employ, under the
state constitution, a more protective standard in order to establish
predictability and precision for judicial review of search and
seizure issues and protection of citizens' rights. 161 The court of
appeals expressed its dissatisfaction 162 with the Supreme Court's
position in New York v. Belton, 163 that under the Fourth
Amendment a warrantless search of a closed container in an
automobile was permissible as a search incident to a lawful
151. 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989).
152. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.




157. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
158. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
159. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
160. Id. at 228, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
161. Id.; see also People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 501 N.E.2d
556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 912 (1986); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398,
407, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (1985).
162. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 229, 543 N.E.2d at 64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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arrest. 164 Commenting on the Supreme Court's drastic departure
from Chimel v. California165 in New York v. Belton, 166 the court
of appeals stated that "'search and seizure law [becomes]
uncontrollable when the rubric [is] adopted and the rationale
discarded.' 167
The Torres court condemned the conduct of the officers as not
being "reasonably related to the need to protect the officer's
safety,"' 168 due to the fact that the suspect was no longer within
reach of the vehicle.169 The court further concluded that the
officers' actions were improper under the New York State
Constitution, and that the resulting evidence should have been
suppressed. 170
The Torres dissent, in advocating uniformity between the state
and federal constitutions, cited public policy as support for its
position. 171 The dissent explained that the New York police were
in as much danger, if not more, than other police departments
throughout the United States. 172 Therefore, "there [wa]s no jus-
tification for bestowing a different and more onerous, and far
more dangerous rule of reason, operative only ...under our
State Constitution." 173
In a recent New York Court of Appeals decision, People v.
Dunn, 174 the court lent further support for its strict construction
of the state constitution with regard to searches and seizures. 175
164. Id. at 462.
165. 395 U.S. 752 (1968).
166. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
167. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 229, 543 N.E.2d at 64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 799
(alteration in original) (quoting People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 267, 298
N.E.2d 78, 86, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900, 911 (1973)).
168. Id. at 231, 543 N.E.2d at 65-66, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
169. Id. at 230, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
170. Id. at 231, 543 N.E.2d at 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
171. Id. at 234, 543 N.E.2d at 68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
174. 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991).
175. Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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The court noted that in past years it "has not hesitated to interpret
article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart when the
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in a given area has threat-
ened to undercut the right of our citizens to be free from unrea-
sonable government intrusions. " 176 The court concluded that we
should not lose sight of the fact that "[tihe State Constitution
protects the privacy interests of the people of our State . ..
against the unfettered discretion of government officials to search
or seize. "177
B. Appellate Division Cases
Thus far, the analysis has focused on New York Court of
Appeals case law that has dealt with searches incident to a lawful
arrest, due to the fact that the court has yet to address the
protective sweep issue. An examination of the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division decisions that discussed
protective sweeps incident to a lawful arrest is necessary because
this analysis may shed some light on how the New York Court of
Appeals will rule on this issue.
In People v. Ocasio,178 the appellate division, fourth depart-
ment adopted the trial court's 179 holding that when the police re-
ceived reliable information that stolen guns were stored on the
premises, they were entitled to make a protective sweep through-
176. Id. In Dunn, the use of a "canine sniff" was not deemed to be a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus, was not improper
under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 23, 564 N.E.2d at 1056, 563 N.Y.S.2d
at 390. However, the court of appeals found that it was a search under the state
constitution, but was not violative of the state constitutional mandate because
the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the sniff search. Id. at 26, 564
N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. The court's construction of the state
constitution "requires that the police have at least a reasonable suspicion that a
residence contains illicit contraband before . . . [a canine sniff] may be
employed." Id. at 21, 564 N.E.2d at 1055, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
177. Id. at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
178. 120 A.D.2d 932, 502 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep't 1986).
179. 106 Misc. 2d 138, 430 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1980). The appellate division noted that the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed for reasons stated in the trial court's opinion. Therefore, this
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out the building. 180 The court stated that this enabled the police
to ensure that there were no guns available to anyone not in
custody and that there were no other persons present who could
pose a threat to the their safety. 181
In Ocasio, stolen guns were reported to be located in the de-
fendant's house, and when the police arrived they were
instructed, upon the lawful arrest of the defendant, to sweep the
building for the weapons. 182 In justifying the constitutionality of
the search, the trial court, on federal grounds, 183 reasoned that
the police officers could have reasonably concluded that their
lives were endangered due to the presence of weapons. 184 The
court stated that the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Chimel v. California 185 "should not be construed as absolutely
prohibiting searches beyond the area of the arrestee's reach." ' 186
The court stated that "the officer's have a right to assure their
safety and they may look elsewhere on the premises to guard
against the chance that third parties may offer resistance." ' 187 It
seems that as early as 1980, the lower courts in New York were
willing to support protective sweeps or searches as
constitutional. 18 8
In People v. Febus,189 the court noted that several United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decisions took the
180. Id. at 143, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 139, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
183. Ocasio, was decided solely on federal grounds because the defendant
did not raise a state constitutional claim.
184. Ocasio, 106 Misc. 2d at 142, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
185. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text
(discussing Chimel).
186. Ocasio, 106 Misc. 2d at 143, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
187. Id. at 143-44, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 976. When the trial court heard this
case in 1980, Chimel was the principal authority at the federal level on
searches incident to lawful arrests.
188. In 1986, the appellate division, fourth department affirmed the trial
court's judgment in Ocasio and adopted its reasoning. See 120 A.D.2d 932,
502 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep't 1986).
189. 157 A.D.2d 380, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1st Dep't), appeal granted, 76
N.Y.2d 898, 562 N.E.2d 885, 561 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1990), appeal denied, 77
N.Y.2d 835, 568 N.E.2d 652, 567 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1991).
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position, "that when police officers have lawfully entered the
premises to effect an arrest, they are entitled to make a quick and
limited pass through the premises to check for third persons who
may. . . pose a threat to [their safety]."' 190 The facts in Febus
illustrate the New York appellate division's willingness to allow
intrusive protective sweeps under New York law.191 Police
officers responded to a radio call that four men were seen with
guns entering a certain building. 192 When the police reached the
third floor in their attempt to find the men, they encountered a
minor child who was seen leaving an apartment holding several
pouches of white powder and some money. 193 Shortly thereafter,
the police pushed open the defendant's apartment door and
searched the premises for guns. 194 The court relied on the
officers' argument that they were "[f]earful that 'there was a gun
on the other side [of the door] to shoot' [them] .... "19S
Although it was never ascertained whether the men identified in
the radio call were the men in the apartment, the defendant was
arrested and the evidence seized in the sweep was admitted. 196
Rationalizing the protective sweep of the defendant's apart-
ment, the appellate division stated that "[a] police officer ...
cannot and should not close his eyes to reality and does not have
to 'await the glint of steel' before acting to protect himself or
others." 197 The court concluded that the intrusion in this case
190. Febus, 157 A.D.2d at 382, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
191. The court did not specifically discuss the validity of protective sweeps
under the New York State Constitution because it recognized the "dearth of
case law directly on point in our State courts." Id. Therefore, the court relied
on federal authority to justify the sweep of the defendant's apartment. It is my
opinion that the lack of an analysis under the state constitution is one of the
reasons why this case was denied review by the New York Court of Appeals.
See supra note 189.
192. Febus, 157 A.D.2d at 381, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 384, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
196. Id. at 385, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 384, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (quoting People v. Benjamin, 51
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was "minimal" 198 compared to that in Maryland v. Buie 199 and
that "the officer's pushing open of the apartment door was rea-
sonable in the context of a protective sweep and within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment," as was Buie's more intru-
sive sweep. 200 The appellate division in Febus did not afford the
defendant more rights under the New York State Constitution
even though it had the power to do so. 201 Rather, it permitted the
protective sweep, applying the Fourth Amendment and its
interpretation by the Buie court. 202
Most recently in People v. Rivera,20 3 the appellate division,
fourth department held that police officers were reasonably pru-
dent in believing that based on articulable facts "the attic of de-
fendant's home might harbor an individual posing a danger to
those on the scene,'" 204 and that a limited protective sweep of
that area in conjunction to a lawful arrest was proper. 205 Once
again, it appears the New York Appellate Division is not af-
fording New York citizens more rights under article I, section 12
of the New York State Constitution. 206
198. Id. Classifying the sweep as one less intrusive than the sweep in Buie,
the Febus court indicated that the sweep is certainly constitutional under the
fourth amendment because it fits within Buie's broader holding. Id. at 385,
556 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
199. 494 U.S. 325 (1990); see supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text
(discussing Buie standard permitting protective sweeps).
200. Febus, 157 A.D.2d at 385, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 385, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03. In Buie, the United States
Supreme Court found that the officers could "'look in closets and in other
spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched."' Id. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334). The appellate
division added that "[e]learly, the slightly ajar door [in Febus] . . . fell within
this definition." Id. at 385, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
203. 172 A.D.2d 1059, 569 N.Y.S.2d 316 (4th Dep't 1991).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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C. Protective Sweeps in Other Jurisdictions after Buie
A comment discussing the constitutionality of protective sweeps
would not be complete without some review of how other state's
have treated the issue after the Buie decision. In State v.
Murdock,207 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a search
of the defendant's pantry room drawer was proper and that the
evidence seized would not be excluded. 208 The court reasoned
that the texts of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 11
of the Wisconsin Constitution209 were "essentially identical, '" 210
and that the court "'has consistently and routinely conformed the
law of search and seizure under the state constitution to that
developed by the United States Supreme Court under the fourth
amendment.' 211 This is an example of a state judiciary adopting
a policy of uniformity between the two nearly identical sections.
However, the New York Court of Appeals has not yet set a firm
policy on the matter. 212 The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on
the Chimel rule 213 to justify the search of the pantry drawer for
207. 455 N.W.2d 618 (Vis. 1990).
208. See Murdock, 455 N.W.2d at 626-27. A rifle was found in a pantry
drawer. Id. at 622. See supra note 17 (discussing the exclusionary rule).
209. Wis. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath of
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
210. Id.at 622.
211. Id. (quoting State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 575, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 989 (Vis. 1986)).
212. See People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982) (the Supreme Court upheld a police officer's search
of defendant's zippered jacket pocket inside the passenger compartment of a
car, after a lawful arrest, while the arrestees were standing outside the car, as a
search incident to a lawful arrest, and the court of appeals upheld under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement). See supra notes 118-31 and
accompanying text (discussing interpretation of identical language between the
fourth amendment and article 1, § 12 of the New York State Constitution).
213. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The rule permits searches
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weapons. 214 Although a person could not hide in a drawer, and
thus, the search was not a protective sweep, the court recognized
Buie as "affirming the efficacy of the Chimel rule." 2 15
In Hayes v. State,216 the Nevada Supreme Court held that a
protective sweep was not justified because police officers did not
have "sufficient grounds to fear for their safety." ' 217 The court
stated that the "sole purpose [of a protective.sweep] is to protect
police officers during the course of an arrest from potentially
dangerous persons other than the arrestee who are believed to be
on the premises." 218 The court concluded that the standard stated
by the majority in Buiewas a reasonable one. 219 Moreover, the
court proclaimed that "[w]e are bound to follow the
constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme Court,
and we further adopt it as the standard to be applied in the State
of Nevada.- 2
20
In Smith v. State,221 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a
protective sweep of a locked storage room adjacent to the room
where the arrest occurred was not justified and did not fall within
the protective sweep exception for warrantless searches. 222 The
immediate control of a weapon. Id. at 763. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
214. Murdock, 455 N.W.2d at 623.
215. Id.
216. 797 P.2d 962 (Nev. 1990).
217. Id. at 965. Article I, § 18 of the Nevada Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
of Affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be
searched, and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.
NEv. CONST. art. I, § 18.
218. Id. In Hayes, officers discovered drugs and records of drug sales while
executing a protective sweep of the defendant's mobile home upon lawful
arrest of the defendant. Id. at 964.
219. Id. at 966.
220. Id.
221. 565 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1991).
222. Id. at 1063. Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure shall not be
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court adopted the Buie standard that the arresting officers must
reasonably believe that the area to be swept harbors an individual
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.m2 3 The court ex-
plained that the officers' reasons for searching the locked room
did not constitute Buie's requirement of "specific and articulable
facts ' 224 because they only had a "hunch" that someone could
possibly be hiding in the room. 225
The cases discussed above exemplify a state court's ability to
adopt only the base level protection of the Fourth Amendment in
the area of protective sweeps as interpreted by Buie. It should be
noted, however, that even though the states have adopted the
same standard, they may apply it differently. Although these
cases have no binding effect on the New York Court of Appeals,
they may be viewed as persuasive authority for finding protective
sweeps constitutional under New York law.
CONCLUSION
Under current federal law, a "protective sweep" incident to a
lawful arrest is constitutional, provided the searching police of-
ficer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articula-
ble facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the
area swept, harbors an individual posing a danger to the officer
or others.
The New York Court of Appeals is faced with the tough ques-
tion of deciding whether or not it will choose to expand upon the
rights afforded to its citizens by the Fourth Amendment and de-
clare protective sweeps unconstitutional. If the court chooses not
to expand upon the Fourth Amendment, then it will signify the
violated; and no wan-ant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 11.
223. Id. at 1062.
224. Id. at 1063. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (discussing
Buie's "specific and articulable facts" requirement).
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court's approval of the Buie standard and its requirements. I be-
lieve this is the direction that the New York Court of Appeals
will travel when it faces the issue of the constitutionality of pro-
tective sweeps. As to this date however, the court has not
addressed the issue.226 In a state such as New York, which has
an enormously high amount of crime,227 I believe the judiciary
should clarify the search and seizure law in the important area of
protective sweeps.
Steven M. Fox
226. The court of appeals granted appeal to People v. Febus and then
retracted and denied appeal a few months later. People v. Febus, 157 A.D.2d
380, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1st Dep't), appeal granted, 76 N.Y.2d 898, 562
N.E.2d 885, 561 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 835, 568
N.E.2d 652, 567 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1991).
227. See, e.g., Allen R. Gold, Businesses Offer Aid to Dinkins to Combat
Crime, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1990, at B4.
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